Difference against development: spiritual accumulation and the politics of freedom by Kraniauskas, John
 
 
Birkbeck ePrints: an open access repository of the 





Kraniauskas, John (2005). Difference against 
development: spiritual accumulation and the politics of 
freedom. Boundary 2 32 (2): 53-80 
 
This is an exact copy of a paper published in Boundary 2 (ISSN 0190-3659). It 
is reproduced with permission from the publisher. Personal use of this 
material is permitted. However, permission to reprint/republish this material for 
advertising or promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for 
resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any copyrighted 
component of this work in other works, must be obtained from the publisher. 
Copyright © 2005 Duke University Press.  
Copyright and all rights therein are retained by authors or by other copyright 
holders. All persons downloading this information are expected to adhere to 
the terms and constraints invoked by copyright. This document or any part 
thereof may not be reposted without the explicit permission of the copyright 
holder.  
 
Citation for this copy: 
Kraniauskas, John (2005). Difference against development: spiritual 




Citation as published:  
Kraniauskas, John (2005). Difference against development: spiritual 





Contact Birkbeck ePrints at lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk 
Difference Against Development: Spiritual Accumulation
and the Politics of Freedom
John Kraniauskas
Paul Ricoeur’s account of the end of Hegelianism in his Time and
Narrative is summarized in the following paragraph: ‘‘It now seems to us
as though Hegel, seizing a favourable moment, a kairos, which has been
revealed for what it was to our perspective and our experience, only total-
ized a few leading aspects of the spiritual history of Europe and of its geo-
graphical and historical environment, ones that, since that time, have come
undone.What has come undone is the very substance of what Hegel sought
to make into a concept. Difference has turned against development con-
ceived of as a Stufengang [a ‘‘succession of stages’’].’’ In Ricoeur’s state-
ment, the historical experience of postcolonialism critically encounters He-
gelian dialectics, reducing its claims to universality back to particularity in
a gesture Dipesh Chakrabarty has referred to as ‘‘provincializing Europe.’’ 1
There has been a crisis, both historical and philosophical, in the Eurocen-
1. Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 3, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 204–5; and Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincial-
izing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 2000). Hereafter, Ricoeur’s work is cited parenthetically as TN.
boundary 2 32:2, 2005. Copyright © 2005 by Duke University Press.
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trism (‘‘spirit’’) that upholds Hegel’s concept of reason and its developmen-
tal unfolding (which, as we shall see, is an unfolding of freedom), a crisis
that has not only interrupted philosophy’s (Hegelian) realization but also
revealed its constituent unrealizability.2 Ricoeur is referring to the combined
effects of the First World War, the Russian Revolution, the rise of fascism,
the Second World War and the Holocaust, as well as to the emergence of
anticolonial struggles in Africa and Asia. All have combined to produce an
effect of decentering and the independence of ‘‘difference’’ from dialecti-
cal capture. This is one of the main reasons why so much contemporary
philosophy and theory deﬁnes itself as explicitly anti-Hegelian. Although,
alternatively, in Hegelian mode, one might also suggest that this ‘‘turning
against’’ may be nothing more than the cunning work of reason.
What follows are a series of reﬂections on Ricoeur’s statement. I
begin with a description of Hegel’s philosophical prose of world history as
contained in his most popular work, The Philosophy of History, in an attempt
to unpack the political signiﬁcance of the idea of ‘‘development’’ in history.
This is crucial, because what is ‘‘developed’’ in Hegel’s world history is the
history of ‘‘freedom.’’ Second, I will outline other kinds of conceptual inter-
ruption of Hegel’s temporalization of history associated, in particular, with
the idea of its materialist ‘‘inversion’’—those of Marx, Adorno, and Mario
Tronti—focusing especially on Louis Althusser’s direct confrontation with the
Hegelian side of Marxism contained in his demand to think history differ-
entially and conjuncturally. This account provides the occasion to question
Ricoeur’s statement and suggest instead that difference turns against devel-
opment as more development (arguably the more important postcolonial
experience). This, I argue, is the implication of the most radical aspects of
subalternist critique, which emerges from such a historical recognition in
neocolonial times to present itself as what might be described as a disjunc-
tural critique of the total apparatus of development conceived as the imperial
time of capital. In Spectral Nationality, Pheng Cheah has suggested that
subalternism is characterized by an antiphilosophical outlook.3 I will argue,
in contrast, that the work of critics such as Chakrabarty, Ranajit Guha, and
2. In his Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1973), Theodor
Adorno registers this historical moment as follows: ‘‘Philosophy, which once seemed obso-
lete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed’’ (3).
3. Pheng Cheah, Spectral Nationality: Passages of Freedom from Kant to Postcolonial
Literatures of Liberation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). The difference
between Cheah and radical subalternism is his defense of the nation-form.
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Gayatri Spivak constitutes an intense engagement with the philosophy of
history (particularly historicism), reconceived from the standpoint of the cul-
tural politics of historiographical and literary form and its colonial/imperial
content. The key (and most insistent) question articulated by their disjunc-
turalist critique is: What kinds of subjects are ‘‘possible’’ subjects of free-
dom? Insofar as their work poses such a question anew froman antidevelop-
mentalist perspective, one might suggest that they also posit the conditions
for a possible new subaltern post-Hegelian world history. From this perspec-
tive, what is at stake in Hegel’s philosophy of world history is the question
of emancipatory political subjectivity.
Development
‘‘A State is a realization of Spirit, such that in it the self-conscious
being of Spirit—the freedom of the will—is realized as Law,’’ writes Hegel
in his discussion and comparison of Chinese and Hindoo [sic] civilizations.4
This deﬁnition of the state is important for a number of reasons, the most
important being that it helps us understand that, in offering it, Hegel is com-
paring a civilization that has history with another that does not. China, he
insists, has a state. Indeed, as a despotic state, in Hegel’s view, it ‘‘may
be regarded as nothing else but a state’’ (PH, 161). ‘‘Hindoo’’ civilization,
on the other hand, may constitute a people, but it is not a state. This is
because, he insists, Indian society has not been established on the basis
of law (that is, freedom as abstract will) or of spiritual self-consciousness
(subjective freedom) in opposition to nature. China, it follows from this argu-
ment, has history, while India does not—the historicity of each (or lack of it)
established in relation to predominant forms of political subjectivity (the self-
consciousness of freedom—even if this refers, as in Hegel’s China, only to
the ‘‘freedom’’ of an emperor—as expressed in state form).
What is the relation Hegel establishes between history and the state?
It is clearly fundamental, for the state form establishes a principle of freedom
that becomes history’s condition. In this respect, Hegel is a state thinker,
history emerging in this ﬁrst stage of its development in China as the history
of despotic ‘‘freedom’’ (and ‘‘law’’) experienced, he also notes, as unfree-
dom (because, Hegel is clear, history is not a ‘‘theatre of happiness’’ [PH,
4. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (New York:
Dover Publications, 1956), 160. This English translation is based on Karl Hegel’s German
edition of 1840. Hereafter, this work is cited parenthetically as PH.
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26]).5 This also means, however, that history is a social institution, in which
what has happened and its experience and narration—that is, history in both
its meanings as a concept—are gathered together in writing. The stately
archive, so important to Michel de Certeau’s analysis of the emergence of
modern history writing, thus has a history too.6 In Ricoeur’s words, the state
is ‘‘the historical conﬁguration where the idea and its satisfaction [‘‘the cun-
ning of reason’’] come together’’ (TN, 197). Hegel writes:
[I]t is the State which ﬁrst presents subject-matter that is not only
adapted to the prose of History, but involves the production of such
history in the very progress of its own being. Instead of merely sub-
jective mandates on the part of the government . . . a community
that is acquiring a stable existence, and exalting itself into a State,
requires formal commands and laws . . . and this produces a record
aswell as interest concernedwith intelligent, deﬁnite . . . lasting trans-
actions and occurrences; on which Mnemosyne, for the behoof of
the perennial object of the formation and constitution of the State, is
impelled to confer perpetuity. (PH, 61)
This is the place, therefore, as Ricoeur notes, where historical time becomes
one—as a collective singular—uniting the freedom of the Spirit with the pas-
sion of individuals (TN, 197). From this point of view, the state is a record-
ing machine, and all of history’s determinations, such as time and freedom,
pass through it. The state contains and orders the former—because, left to
its own devices, time, like Chronos, devours, it is a force of nature (PH, 75–
76)—while it enshrines freedom as law. ‘‘The State,’’ writes Hegel, is ‘‘the
embodiment of rational freedom, realizing and recognizing itself in an objec-
tive form’’ (PH, 47).
The history of freedom, in turn, is the history of spirit—the objective
content of Hegel’s secular history—which realizes itself in and through itself,
for itself, as freedom.7 As Cheah has shown, this idea of spirit is ‘‘organis-
mic’’ and derived from Kant’s notion of culture as formation (Bildung), out-
lined in the second part of his Critique of Judgement, ‘‘Critique of Teleo-
5. Crucially, for Hegel, freedom is not merely an individual attribute but a social condition
that must be instituted.
6. See Michel de Certeau, TheWriting of History, trans. Tom Conley (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1988). Such a gathering in the state produces a subject position, that of
the absolutist monarch—whose temporality, with Machiavelli, becomes secular (7)—and
its documentation (or archive) (74).
7. See Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 47.
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logical Judgement,’’ and which takes the life of the self-recursive organism
as its model. In opposition to mechanical natural causality, the organism
is self-originating and self-organizing, positing its own limits and setting its
own ends. Nature’s teleological end, according to Kant, is the happiness
of ‘‘man,’’ and this organicizing power (the ‘‘aptitude’’ of ‘‘determining ends’’
out of itself) is ‘‘nature’s gift’’ to the human race. Kant refers to it, follow-
ing Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, as a ‘‘formative drive,’’ or Bildungstreib.8
According to Cheah, this is an ‘‘incarnational’’ and ‘‘self-originating’’ concep-
tion of culture, which in Kant becomes the model of autonomy, moral free-
dom, and the transcendence of ﬁnitude, as well as the ontological ground
for ‘‘culture’s cobelonging with politics’’ as Bildung. And since for Kant ‘‘the
constitutional political body is culture’s highest achievement,’’ its ‘‘organis-
mic causality’’ becomes ‘‘the ontological paradigm and ultimate end of the
ideal constitutional state.’’9 The writings of Fichte and Hegel give sociologi-
cal shape to Kant’s abstract cosmopolitanism, incarnating freedom in either
the people-nation (Fichte) or the ideal state as the unity of sovereign will and
political constitution (Hegel).
However, such an organicist process of self-positing, differentiation,
and mediated self-uniﬁcation (the positing of ends and their immanent tran-
scendence: Spirit-as-Freedom-in-State-as-Right-is-History . . .) is perhaps
one of the reasons why Adorno, for his part, suggests that when, in Hegel’s
panlogistic prose of world history, we read the word freedom, we would do
better to read ‘‘big guns’’: ‘‘the idea of a positivity that can master every-
thing that opposes it through the superior power of a comprehending spirit
is the mirror image of the experience of the superior coercive force inher-
ent in everything that exists by virtue of its consolidation under domination.
This is the truth of Hegel’s untruth.’’ 10 The fact that in Hegel’s philosophi-
cal history, world history emerges in despotism and ‘‘ends’’ in constitutional
8. Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1986), 92–97, paragraph 83. Culture, in turn (and this is the begin-
ning of Cheah’s deconstruction of Kant’s account), depends on a founding ‘‘ingratitude’’
toward nature’s gift, which, since it ‘‘cannot give itself to us in any other way but mechani-
cally,’’ takes the form of a retroactive anthropomorphism or mimeticism that paradoxically
erases human heteronomy (its ﬁnitude) with regard to the contingency of nature’s gift con-
ceived contradictorily as ‘‘inhuman techne’’ (Cheah, Spectral Nationality, 110–11).
9. Cheah, Spectral Nationality, 61–113. See Immanuel Kant, ‘‘Idea for a Universal History
with a Cosmopolitan Intent,’’ in Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, trans. Ted Humphrey
(Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992), 31–34.
10. Theodor Adorno, Hegel: Three Studies, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), 87.
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monarchy would seem to conﬁrm Adorno’s truth. Which brings us back to
Hegel’s comparison of China and India.
Hegel’s world history is not, however, just a history of the state as an
administrative or repressive apparatus. As the conceptual afﬁnity between
Kant’s idea of culture and Hegel’s idea of spirit suggests, it is a history of
spirit as state form from the point of view of its constitution—despotic, aris-
tocratic, republican, and monarchic—as politically mediated subjectivity.11 If
India is a ‘‘people’’ without a state, China is a state without a people, for
there is no ‘‘free will.’’ Paradoxically, this is what constitutes India’s advance
on China with respect to its ‘‘political life’’ (PH, 144). Hegel’s explanation of
China’s underdevelopment in this regard is that the unity of China’s des-
potic state is not mediated by the ‘‘divergence into difference’’ that ‘‘free
subjectivity’’ (PH, 144–45) entails and that would make it into a social sys-
tem. China has a vast and meticulous archive, but it reﬂects only the limit-
less power of the emperor.12 India, on the other hand, has great poetry,
in Hegel’s view, reﬂecting the power of an ‘‘untamed’’ popular imagination
still, however, in thrall to nature. And, famously, for Hegel, the idea of the
‘‘people’’ ‘‘refers to that category of citizens who do not know their own
will.’’ 13 Thus, history emerges with despotic state form, rather than with
a people constituted ‘‘irrationally’’ through castes—which betrays a lack
of self-differentiation from nature in its constitution—and whose subjec-
tive relation to ‘‘freedom’’ thus remains unmediated and unbound by the
abstract(ing) quality of law. India’s historical advance therefore does not
constitute a development and so remains, paradoxically, ahistorical. In this
sense, Hegel’s comparison also reveals how development in the course of
history ‘‘is not a chronological sequence’’ (nor an evolution) but what Ricoeur
refers to as ‘‘a winding up that is at the same time an unfolding, a process
of making explicit, and a return upon itself of the spirit’’ (TN, 201), that is, a
realization.
It is thus not the case that Hegel’s prose is indifferent to difference
as such. His state-centered account of Spirit, rather, incorporates difference
into its plot so as, for example, to leave it behind as prehistory. From this
11. For Gillian Rose, Hegel’s concept of spirit is cultural insofar as it is actualized in a dialec-
tics of recognition and misrecognition. See her Hegel Contra Sociology (London: Athlone
Press, 1981).
12. For which, see Kenneth Dean and Brian Massumi, The First and Last Emperors: The
Absolute State and the Body of the Despot (New York: Autonomedia, 1992).
13. G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H. B.
Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 340.
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point of view, difference is fundamental to the idea of development in his-
tory, establishing a temporal principle of comparativity necessary to charting
its ‘‘course’’ through stages. Hegel’s prose is rather indifferent to the differ-
ence of difference from the point of view of the present realization of Spirit—
insofar, that is, as the present state form constitutes a synthesis of the dif-
ferent moments of the development of Spirit as freedom (everything else
remains unhistorical, even if contemporary). History therefore becomes a
formative process, a Bildung, into freedom. Hegel’s deﬁnition of the state
in his account of the historicity of the Oriental World thus works retrospec-
tively, arranging it in critical and historical perspective, and prospectively, so
as also to illuminate the ‘‘modern’’ Northern European endpoint from where
World History is articulated. China and India (as well as Greece and Rome)
qua civilizations are deﬁnitely past, but they also embody identiﬁable stages
(at times emplotted in the form of a maturation: childhood, boyhood, man-
hood, old age) leading up to the present. In terms of its deﬁning politico-
juridical values, then, Hegel’s philosophy of history is present-centered—
the ‘‘end’’ that receives the past, provides perspective, and from where it
emplots its own realization. In other words, it is a genealogy that, as Adorno
notes, ‘‘takes the side of what exists.’’ 14
The idea of development thus gives cultural and political shape
to the history of spirit—as subjective freedom—as it is ‘‘incarnated’’ (to
use Cheah’s term) in state form, that is, as right. In response to Joseph
McCarney’s insistence that ‘‘. . . racist assumptions are not merely otiose
in Hegel’s argument and lacking in textual warrant . . . [t]hey would also
directly contradict the universalism of his philosophy of spirit with its cen-
tral themes of freedom as the birthright of all . . . ,’’ 15 Robert Bernasconi
has insisted, on the contrary, that it is precisely this contradiction—between
freedom (universality) and its (racist and/or culturalist) limitation—that char-
acterizes the philosophies of both Hegel and Kant (among others).16 More
14. Adorno, Hegel: Three Studies, 85.
15. Joseph McCarney, Hegel on History (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 145.
16. Robert Bernasconi, ‘‘Hegel’s Racism: A Reply to McCarney,’’ Radical Philosophy 119
(May/June 2003): 35–37. See also his ‘‘Will the Real Kant Please Stand Up: The Challenge
of Enlightenment Racism to the Study of the History of Philosophy,’’ Radical Philosophy
117 (January/February 2003): 13–22, where he points out the importance of ‘‘investigat-
ing Kant’s racism in its coexistence with cosmopolitanism’’ (17). In his A Kant Dictionary
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), Howard Caygill has also noted that Kant’s concept of
culture as Bildung is also socially divided between those who have it through ‘‘discipline’’
and those who service the latter with their ‘‘skill’’ and are not so blessed (145–50). See
Kant, The Critique of Judgement, 95–96.
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speciﬁcally, Hegel’s well-known expulsion of a supposedly uncivilized Africa
from world history and his suggestion that slavery ‘‘frees’’ Africans from sub-
jection to their own environment are shown, through a detailed reading of
his sources, to be based on highly exaggerated accounts of fetishism and
cannibalistic colonial fantasies, as well as on the deliberate ignorance of
alternative contemporary accounts. ‘‘The principle of Development,’’ Hegel
writes, ‘‘involves . . . the existence of a latent germ of being—a capacity or
potentiality striving to realize itself.’’ This is a potentiality—or, in Kant’s terms,
‘‘nature’s gift’’ qua self-formative drive—that Africans are denied in his phi-
losophy. ‘‘This formal conception,’’ he continues, ‘‘ﬁnds actual existence in
Spirit, which has the History of the World for its theatre, its possession and
the sphere of its realization’’ (PH, 54). Which is also why, in Hegel’s view,
America has no history either, because it belongs to a future which has as
yet no claims on his present. It ‘‘performs’’ still, in his example of the Jesuit
civilizing mission in Paraguay, to a colonial—that is, European—bell.17
Bernasconi points out that Kant’s teleological account of culture in
the Critique of Judgement extends and transforms ideas ﬁrst established in
Kant’s production of the modern concept of ‘‘race’’—for example, in ‘‘On the
Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy,’’ written in 1788—and, as we
have seen, this is the organismic account taken over by Hegel into his spiri-
tualized conceptualization of freedom in history.18 Bernasconi concludes
that ‘‘questions remain about the extent to which contemporary ideas, for
example of social development, remain tied to a model that can best be
described as colonialist.’’ 19 Although he breaks off from demonstrating pre-
cisely how Hegel’s racist and colonialist use of sources marks his concep-
tual production and his ideas of spirit, freedom, and universality as such,
17. Hegel writes: ‘‘When the Jesuits and the Catholic clergy proposed to accustom the Indi-
ans to European culture and manners . . . they commenced a close intimacy with them,
and prescribed for them the duties of the day, which, slothful though their disposition was,
they complied with under the authority of the Friars. These prescripts (at midnight a bell
had to remind them even of their matrimonial duties), were ﬁrst, and very wisely, directed
to the creation of wants—the springs of human activity generally’’ (PH, 81–82).
18. See Robert Bernasconi, ‘‘Hegel at the Court of the Ashanti,’’ inHegel After Derrida, ed.
Stuart Barnett (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 41–63. See also ‘‘Who Invented
the Concept of Race? Kant’s Role in the Enlightenment Construction of Race,’’ in Race,
ed. Robert Bernasconi (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 11–36. Bernasconi
shows that Kant’s scientiﬁc concept of ‘‘race’’ both ‘‘secured the unity of humanity as a
natural genus’’ and established ‘‘deviations within this genus which maintain themselves
over protracted generations’’ (22).
19. Bernasconi, ‘‘Hegel at the Court of the Ashanti,’’ 63.
Kraniauskas / Spiritual Accumulation and the Politics of Freedom 61
he more or less hints at its certain presence. In my view, there can be little
doubt that Hegel’s idea of development—as set out in The Philosophy of
History—constitutes such a key philosophical site in which the contradic-
tion between universal freedom and racism is played out, conceptually man-
aged, and given historical form. From this point of view, the concept of devel-
opment is haunted by a racialization of spirit and freedom that is enacted
through an originary and founding expulsion.20
Like the idea of culture itself, however, ‘‘development’’ arguably re-
mains an important, even necessary, concept (it has sedimented itself into
so many theoretical discourses that it is extremely difﬁcult to dispense with),
which, if irreducible to its racist history, nevertheless bears such historical
experiences that it demands both theoretical and historical reﬂexivity in its
use. In other words, thus ‘‘scariﬁed’’ by history, it acquires a historicity of its
own and articulates a need for a politics of theory.
The idea of development is crucial to the prose of world history, pro-
viding it with an Imperial grammar of spatiotemporal organization and com-
parison. First, according to Hegel, development implies ‘‘perfectibility’’ and
‘‘gradation’’ in the history of spirit: ‘‘a series of increasingly adequate expres-
sions or manifestations of Freedom, which result from its Idea’’ (PH, 63)—
which also implies inadequate expressions. Second, development gives di-
rection to history’s movement and change: self-determining and ‘‘at war with
itself’’ (PH, 55), writes Hegel, spirit ‘‘assumes successive forms which it suc-
cessfully transcends; and by this very process of transcending its earlier
stages, gains an afﬁrmative, and, in fact, a richer and more concrete shape’’
(PH, 63). The idea of development emplots each stage geohistorically, join-
ing and separating the history of ‘‘worlds’’ across space and time into a nar-
rative full of cultural and political meaning. It is in contemporary, ‘‘modern
time’’—where Hegel’s history ends—that the ﬁnal ‘‘shape’’ of spirit and free-
dom are realized. And as Hegel brings his history to a conclusion, he makes
an important point that foregrounds the ‘‘cobelonging of politics and culture’’
as Bildung: ‘‘For it is a false principle that the fetters which bind Right and
Freedom can be broken without the emancipation of conscience—that there
can be Revolution without Reformation’’ (PH, 453). Revolution—the French
Revolution21—has produced new bourgeois juridico-political structures, and
20. See Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994). It seems to
me that one of the key implications of this book is the warning that whenever one says
‘‘culture,’’ one is also saying ‘‘race.’’
21. Susan Buck-Morss has recently suggested that Hegel might also have been inﬂuenced
by the Haitian Revolution, such that with the section on the master-slave dialectic in his
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Reformation—the Protestant Reformation—has produced new free sub-
jects. In Germany, they have come together in a particularly happy way,
producing its constitutional monarchy and Hegel’s own Philosophy of His-
tory. As mentioned above, this would constitute an ‘‘adequate’’ expression
of the freedom of the spirit. In other European nations (and beyond), how-
ever, for example in Spain, the imposition of postrevolutionary law is resisted
by unreformed subjects—an ‘‘inadequate’’ expression of the freedom of the
spirit. This disjuncture between right and culture, between enlightened law
and subjectivity, remains crucial as a historical experience: the supposed
mismatch (‘‘uneven development’’)—the product of such a developmental-
ist imaginary—a central concern for many nation builders and postcolonial
thinkers as they seek to impose ‘‘modern’’ states and bourgeois ‘‘freedoms.’’
Finally, the idea of development also points to a moment of self-
reﬂexivity in history’s unfolding as it turns back on itself to recover the histori-
cal within history from the point of view of state form (or instituted freedom).
In this sense, ‘‘development’’ captures time, reducing it to mere means, and
eternalizes the historical present by erasing the impact on it both of the
past as past—that is, as different from the present because, now, unhistori-
cal—and of the future. Developmentalismmay thus be conceived, in Hegel’s
account, as the geohistorical consciousness of modernity, which, on the one
hand, takes the form of its tradition and, on the other, is promoted as policy.
In other words, it is a ‘‘bad modernity.’’22 From a subalternist point of view,
insofar as Hegel’s idea of development provides the present with a myth of
politico-cultural spiritual accumulation, it is also a powerful ideology.
Materialist Inversions
From its beginnings in China and India, the ﬁrst two steps taken by
Spirit, Hegel traces the history of the development of world history as the
Phenomenology of Spirit, ‘‘philosophy burst out of the conﬁnes of academic theory and
became a commentary on the history of the world.’’ See Susan Buck-Morss, ‘‘Hegel and
Haiti,’’ Critical Inquiry 26, no. 4 (Summer 2000): 852. By the time of the Philosophy of
History, however, Buck-Morss notes that Hegel, who was ‘‘always a cultural racist if not
a biological one,’’ had conceded to ‘‘slavery’s continuance’’ (864). There is some debate,
however, about whether Hegel’s model is not in fact based on feudalism and its political
overthrow. For an alternative view on Hegel and Haiti, see Sibylle Fischer’s recentModer-
nity Disavowed: Haiti and the Cultures of Slavery in the Age of Revolution (Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 2004), 24–33.
22. See Peter Osborne, The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde (London: Verso,
1995), 115–16. This book has been important for the writing of this essay.
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development of the ‘‘State as a realization of Spirit.’’ This is, perhaps, one
of the reasons why Hegel recapitulates it at the end of his Elements of the
Philosophy of Right, for world history is a matter not only of historical form
but of state and subject forms, too. The power and attraction of Hegel’s
argument is intimately tied to its totalizing intent and to its ability to com-
bine history, politics, and culture: his philosophically reﬂexive history of his-
tory is simultaneously a history of the reconﬁguration of subjects as they
are institutionalized juridico-politically in family, civil society, corporations,
and state. The idea of development, moreover, endows the ‘‘cunning of rea-
son’’—the unintended consequences of actions—with dynamic continuity in
change (necessity). This is the point of Hegel’s history (as against ‘‘original’’
and ‘‘reﬂective’’ history): to reveal its rational character.23 But this is also the
point—Hegel’s panlogism—at which the criticisms of Adorno and Ricoeur
coincide, although for different reasons.
As we have seen, Adorno inverts the signiﬁcance of the unfolding
of the history of spirit in Hegel’s prose, making it instead a history of the
subordination of particulars by right. He suggests, in other words, that we
read Hegel’s work not as a history of freedom’s realization but as a his-
tory of repressive state apparatuses. In this, Adorno follows Marx’s meth-
odological injunction to ‘‘invert’’ Hegel’s dialectic, which he does so literally
by applying it to the work of Hegel himself. Marx, however, did not merely
invert, or materialize, Hegel’s idealist history; his ‘‘translation’’ (for want of
a better word) also displaces it both socially and politically, shifting atten-
tion away from spirit as state form and juridico-political subjectivity, ﬁrst to
civil society (for example, in his ‘‘Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State’’),
subsequently to a notion of economic structure conceived as the contra-
dictory combination of forces and relations of production (in The German
Ideology—where Marx insists that world history is the product of the market
and an international division of labor24—and the preface to his A Contribu-
tion to the Critique of Political Economy ), and ﬁnally to capital and the com-
modity form (in the Grundrisse and Capital ). A constant theme of Marx’s
‘‘inversion’’ is that Hegel’s own philosophical system is itself the product
23. In Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel writes, ‘‘The necessity in ideality is the
development of the Idea within itself; as subjective substantiality, it is the [individual’s]
political disposition, and as objective substantiality—in contrast with the former—it is the
organism of the state, the political state proper and its constitution’’ (288). For a good
account of ‘‘original’’ and ‘‘critical’’ histories in Hegel’s text, see McCarney, Hegel on His-
tory, 10–15.
24. See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, ed. C. J. Arthur (London:
Lawrence and Wishart, 1977), 58.
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of uneven development: the economic underdevelopment—or ‘‘backward-
ness’’—of Germany compensated for in thought.25 Nevertheless, not only
does Marx outline his own developmentalist world history, which passes
through the same ‘‘worlds’’ as the ‘‘course’’ of Hegel’s, but now as a series of
stages conceived as modes of production (oriental, slave, feudal, and capi-
talist); he also at times seems to have been overcome by Hegel’s prose,
substituting capital for spirit or Idea in his account of its logic and develop-
ment.26 This kind of ‘‘inversion’’ of Hegel is the source of Althusser’s com-
plaint: it is not materialist enough, and Hegelianism remains (although ‘‘on
its head’’). Like spirit, for example, capital is fundamentally—that is, substan-
tively—temporal, it ‘‘strives . . . to annihilate this space [the ‘‘whole earth,’’
says Marx] with time’’27—its time: in the reality of exchange, the value form
is indifferent to difference, that is, it is actualized in difference (which it thus
simultaneously erases and maintains).28 On another level, Marx also refers
to ‘‘the great civilizing inﬂuence of capital,’’29 a sentiment that echoes simi-
lar ‘‘developmentalist’’ commentsmade about the French imperial campaign
in Mexico, the British in India, the independence campaign of Simón Bolí-
var in South America, among others, in which European colonial powers act
as formative spiritual inﬂuences (by bringing their recipients up to date—for
example, economically).30
As Arthur notes, Marx’s work is characterized by a fundamental ten-
sion between the historicist (developmentalist) and systematic sides of its
dialectic—the site in his thought, perhaps, of the contradiction between uni-
25. For a critique of this position, see Cheah, Spectral Nationality.
26. The experimental Grundrisse’s (trans. Martin Nicolaus [Harmondsworth: Penguin
Books, 1977]) historical contents on precapitalist modes of production closely follow the
‘‘course’’ of Hegel’s history. See also Marx’s systematic dialectical account of the value
form—passing through the commodity, money, capital, and back—in Capital, whose key
intertext is probably Hegel’s Science of Logic. See Christopher Arthur’s important The
New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital (Boston: Brill, 2002).
27. Marx, Grundrisse, 539. This is an idea recently taken up by Antonio Negri in his
account of the crisis—of measurability—in Marx’s labor theory of value in a context of
the total subsumption of the social by imperial capital. See his Time for Revolution, trans.
Matteo Mandarini (New York: Continuum, 2003).
28. At this level, the commodity form needs difference. Thus, contra critics such as Althus-
ser, Arthur, in The New Dialectic and Marx’s ‘‘Capital,’’ shows how, from the perspective
of Marx, Hegel’s ‘‘Idea’’ is a fetishized rendering of self-valorizing capital.
29. Marx, Grundrisse, 409.
30. Interesting, more or less defensive accounts of which are to be found in Ahmed Aijaz,
In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures (London and New York: Verso, 1992); and José
Aricó, Marx y América Latina (Mexico City: Alianza Editorial Mexicana, 1982).
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versality and its limitation referred to by Bernasconi. But Marx is also writing
from a newly temporalized world-historical perspective, relocating ‘‘univer-
sality’’ as an emancipatory horizon beyond the here and now of capital-and-
spirit: ‘‘Furthermore,’’ he points out, ‘‘the universality toward which it [capital]
irresistibly strives encounters barriers in its own nature, which will, at a cer-
tain stage of its development, allow it to be recognized as being itself the
greatest barrier to this tendency, and hence will strive towards its own sus-
pension.’’31 The crucial question here is what kind of subject will secure the
historical movement into such a future.
Two important ideas suggest that Marx models this account of the
expanding developmentalist logic of capital (‘‘it’’) on spirit: ﬁrst, capital
seems to develop out of and through itself (the self-valorizing logic of
accumulation) across barriers of its own making; and, second, it strives
toward universality and freedom. Both ideas, moreover, combine to pro-
duce a developmental logic with emancipatory intent: freedom out of neces-
sity. They do so, however, by negating the eternalized present of capital
in the name of a different future present. This is because capital is only
self-realizing as exploitation, producing an alienated social totality. In other
words, Marx inverts (philosophically), relocates (socially), and retemporal-
izes (politically) Hegel’s dialectic—such that today, for example, in times of
the ‘‘no-time’’ of network capitalism, we might want to think of ‘‘the cunning
of capital.’’32
At this point, however, Marx’s negation of the present of capital from
the perspective of a different future—his ‘‘translation’’ of Hegel—vacates
the historical and philosophical locus of both spirit and capital, potentially
replacing it with another grounding idea: labor.33 History can now become
the ‘‘course’’ of the realization of its principle as freedom. Within Marxist
traditions, labor, in a world-historical sense, has usually been represented
socially and politically as an embodied subject—the proletariat—considered
negatively, that is, as both the product of capital and as its negation (the
‘‘negation of the negation’’ on which capital depends), and thus the subject
of a postcapitalist development in history. In Hegel’s words again, only this
subject would be an ‘‘adequate’’ expression of such an idea. An important
31. Marx, Grundrisse, 410.
32. See Manuel Castells, The Rise of Network Society (Cambridge, Mass., and Oxford:
Blackwell, 1997).
33. In Spectral Nationality, Cheah shows how labor is the conceptual heir of the organis-
mic concepts of ‘‘culture’’ (Kant) and ‘‘spirit’’ (Hegel). He does not include ‘‘capital’’ in this
history.
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aspect of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire is to suggest retrospec-
tively that the political ﬁgure of the proletariat qua industrial worker, so privi-
leged as the subject of freedom in communist traditions, in fact reiﬁed and
imposed a speciﬁc historical incarnation of capitalist labor as universal (one
that, moreover, also functioned as a powerful modernizing image). As we
shall see below, such a hypostatization of the subject of freedom—and its
cultural implications—is crucial for subalternist criticism, too. Negri’s post-
Marxist thought, however, also gives the so-called materialist inversion of
Hegelianism a further twist. Indeed, in his view, ‘‘living labor’’ (and its politi-
cal correlate, ‘‘the multitude’’) is a founding ontological force, a constituent
power (the power of labor power). Rather than a negativity, it is an autono-
mous positivity. This is the basis of Negri’s subjectivist (and ontologizing)
criticism of what he considers the objectivist teleological trend in Marx’s
Capital: in his view, the multitude—neither capital nor the Imperial state—is
the real subject of value and social cooperation.34 If, in one move, Negri thus
retreats from a positive account of historical development through a succes-
sion of stages conceived as modes of production, it returns in another, now
political, tone, as he takes over, romanticizes, and ontologizes Mario Tronti’s
original worker-centered philosophy of history, conceptualized as ‘‘refusal.’’
In ‘‘The Strategy of Refusal,’’ Tronti observes that ‘‘capitalist power
seeks to use the workers’ antagonistic will-to-struggle as a motor of its
own development . . . exploitation is born, historically, from the necessity
of capital to escape from its de facto subordination to the class [of] worker-
producers.’’ And more: ‘‘it is the directly political thrust of the working class
that necessitates economic development on the part of capital.’’ This ‘‘politi-
cal thrust’’ is what Tronti refers to as ‘‘refusal’’: ‘‘What are workers doing
when they struggle against their employers? Aren’t they, above all, saying
‘No’ to the transformation of labour power into labour?’’ The always-already-
given potentiality for refusal is the living reminder that, in fact, the working
class, while not the ruling class, is most deﬁnitely the historically dominant
one; it simultaneously ‘‘provokes’’ the bourgeoisie into existence as a class
beyond competition and ‘‘provides’’ capital with its laboring subject. Capital,
meanwhile, responds to refusal ‘‘with continual technological ‘revolutions’ in
the organisation of work,’’ that is, by generating ‘‘development’’—because,
for capital, less (class) is more (value).35 Capitalist development, in Tronti’s
34. See my ‘‘Empire, or Multitude: Transnational Negri,’’ Radical Philosophy 103 (Septem-
ber/October 2000): 29–39, from which I have adopted these two paragraphs.
35. Mario Tronti, ‘‘The Strategy of Refusal,’’ trans. Red Notes, in ‘‘Italy: Autonomia; Post-
Political Politics,’’ special issue, Semiotexte 3, no. 3 (1980): 29–31. ‘‘It is the workers’
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view, is thus the result of bourgeois resistance to the power of labor and
can be tracked in its tendential subsumption to ﬁxed capital in the form of
machinery and planning, the attempt by the bourgeoisie to do away with the
labor it depends upon. However, in both Tronti’s and Negri’s texts—includ-
ing Empire—the ﬁgures of the mass and socialized worker-militants have
a tendency to become entrapped in the negative—technological and mod-
ernizing—image of labor and the multitude’s own historical positivity, that is,
in a developmentalism that focuses on and generalizes the experience of
workers of the most ‘‘advanced’’ capitalist sectors to the political detriment
of others. Development in history thus paradoxically reappears through the
back door of the political avant-garde as the future realization of the given.36
For his part, Ricoeur takes little note of Marx’s critical inversion of
Hegel’s history in the collective singular, and includes him only in a gen-
eral ‘‘exodus’’ from Hegelianism. His criticism focuses, ﬁrst, on the post-
philosophical character of modern history and its relation to narrativity, and,
second, on the contemporary impossibility of totalization. Both are related,
he suggests, in the idea of the rationality of the real, which ‘‘alone autho-
rizes’’ positing an ‘‘ultimate goal’’ unfolding out of spirit’s self-realization as
freedom (TN, 195). Scientiﬁc history cannot accept such a teleological pre-
supposition, that is, it cannot be so conceptually linked to future freedom
(which, in turn, is Walter Benjamin’s complaint37). Actions and their mean-
ings, Ricoeur insists, can never be read off from the present that produced
them, no matter how ‘‘cunning’’ the interpretation: their ‘‘otherness’’ in this
respect must be recognized. If this opens up to thought a domain of inde-
terminate political action, it is not one that Ricoeur seeks to occupy—unlike
struggle that materially imposes reformism on capital . . . ,’’ says Negri in ‘‘Labor in the
Constitution,’’ written originally in 1964 but not published until the mid-1970s. In this essay,
Negri develops the political side of the effects of refusal: ‘‘Labor, as a source of complete
social production, becomes a source of the State. . . . Not even right and law can escape
its power.’’ In Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Labour of Dionysus: A Critique of State
Form (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 82.
36. Indeed, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2000), constantly tends—historically and politically—toward the philosophy
of world history it nevertheless refuses, retreating—or breaking down—into a descriptive
empiricism of what it asserts to be a uniﬁed multiplicity (‘‘the one and the many’’). For
Marx, furthermore, especially in Capital, labor is only constituted as a subject by capital
(as variable capital); which means that it is only in this form that labor occupies the same
conceptual space as Hegel’s ‘‘spirit.’’
37. See Walter Benjamin, ‘‘Theses on the Philosophy of History,’’ in Illuminations, trans.
H. Zohn (London: Fontana/Collins, 1979).
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Althusser. Most important, as we have seen, however, is the crisis in Euro-
centrism that upholds both Hegel’s concept of reason and his developmen-
talist narrative. What Ricoeur’s statement misses, however, is the historical
emergence of development as imperial state policy in the years immediately
following the SecondWorldWar in the United States, fromwhere new—neo-
colonial—totalizations of the world might be produced, that is, an ongoing
history of ‘‘freedom’’ as imposed reformation—more development.
As we have seen, the modern idea of development has been cen-
tral not only to the prose of world history, endowing it with a civilizational
grammar and direction, but also to the inter- or transnational experience
and administration of capitalism as it ideologically captures historical time
and deploys it as means. Recent work on ‘‘developmentalism’’ has tended to
privilege this administrative dimension, concentrating particularly on post–
Second World War international policy, beginning, for example, with the
Truman Doctrine of 1947, which was drafted and imposed in the context
of the Cold War and widespread anticolonial struggles, within the parame-
ters of U.S. national security considerations. In such a milieu, according to
Arturo Escobar, combating hunger and malnutrition in newly conceptual-
ized ‘‘underdeveloped societies’’ located in ‘‘the South’’ became the prime
concern of an emerging power-knowledge formation that would include, for
example, area studies, as well as a whole set of knowledges and practices
marshaled as ‘‘rational techniques’’ for their ‘‘construction and treatment.’’38
In the words of Edward Said, on whose Foucaultian account of Oriental-
ism this critique of developmentalism is modeled, such a knowledge for-
mation is not merely a discourse but rather a world-wide ‘‘corporate insti-
tution.’’ From this perspective, the Imperial dimension of developmentalist
policy, intimately tied to theories of modernization—such as the well-known
‘‘stages theory’’ of W. W. Rostow, so important for the formulation of Ken-
nedy’s policy response to the Cuban Revolution, the Alliance for Progress—
is foregrounded and perceived as a form of neocolonialism in biopolitical
mode: it seeks to manage ‘‘life’’ in the so-called Third World. This is the con-
text for the writing of many of the authors considered here, from Althusser to
the subalternists, passing through Ricoeur’s recognition of the connection
between colonialism and development, as well as Adorno’s own writings,
including the Dialectic of Enlightenment, which, from this perspective, argu-
ably constitutes a critical rewriting (in the form of an ‘‘inversion’’) of Hegel’s
38. Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third
World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), 3–20.
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philosophy of history, as a history of domination, from the point of view of a
post-European ‘‘new world.’’39
Althusser’s Interruption
Althusser was one of the foremost and inﬂuential critics of Hegeli-
anism, especially as it had impacted Marxism and the Communist move-
ment. Writing in the 1960s, his work constitutes one of the great structural-
ist rereadings of the time—in his case, of Marx. Although not engaged with
a critique of Eurocentrism, Althusser was, nevertheless, interested in the
logics of uneven development. Under the sign of scientiﬁcity, his engage-
ment withMarx’s work was designed to constitute historical materialism as a
science of the history of social formations established on the basis of its own
concepts, free, especially, from Hegelian interference. His anti-Hegelianism
was thus central to such a constitution. Two ideas are particularly important
here. First, ‘‘overdetermination,’’ which is a transitional concept, Althusser
insists, since it is borrowed from psychoanalysis. It is, nevertheless, crucial
to thinking his second anti-Hegelian idea, ‘‘uneven development,’’ taken from
the Leninist tradition of political Marxism, especially as it was reemerging
as a key contemporary concern with Maoism.40 Both these ideas of over-
determination and uneven development then combine to produce the idea
of differential historical temporalities—a radical denarrativization of histori-
cal development from within a single identiﬁable temporal matrix (as is the
case in Hegel’s world history). Althusser’s conceptual ‘‘development’’ takes
place in the shift from the predominantly political tone of For Marx to the
predominantly philosophical tone of Reading Capital, and back.
One of the central concerns of Althusser’s For Marx is the character
of the dialectic that emerges from Marx’s injunction to ‘‘invert’’ and materi-
alize Hegel’s version, and within that, the character of the contradiction(s)
that informs and makes a social totality. Althusser insists that, in its Marxist
sense, contradiction is never simple, nor is it deﬁned by relations of interi-
ority (that is, as a self-relation) that unfold their essence teleologically. In-
stead, the ‘‘complex whole has the unity of a structure articulated in domi-
39. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cum-
ming (London and New York: Verso, 1979).
40. In my view, Althusser is the theoretician of political Marxism conceived as the expres-
sion of the experience of uneven development. Paradoxically, in this regard, one might
say that he is rethinking Marxism from within a tradition that emerged from what Gramsci
referred to as the ‘‘revolution against Capital.’’
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nance.’’41 Althusser’s approach thus intends to deﬁnitively take us beyond
the Hegelian paradigm. Each of the levels of the social totality—economic,
political, ideological—is deﬁned with a degree of relative autonomy, and
so in multiple relations of exteriority. The idea of overdetermination is cru-
cial here, since it provides for the ‘‘merging’’ of different contradictions in
structured relations of dominance and subordination such that ‘‘it cannot be
claimed that these contradictions and their fusion are merely the pure phe-
nomena of the general contradiction’’ (FM, 100). In other words, the ‘‘simple’’
contradiction that structures the relations of production, for example, cannot
provide the key to contradictions operating at other levels of the social, for
example, in the superstructure, because the latter have their own ‘‘consis-
tency and effectivity’’ (FM, 100) (hence, too, the idea of the ‘‘articulation’’ of
predeﬁned elements rather than their mediated constitution). In For Marx,
Althusser is thus making desperate theoretical attempts to escape ‘‘deter-
mination in the last instance’’ by the economic (from this philosophical point
of view, a specter of Hegelian simplicity that haunts Marxism’s desire for
analytic complexity).
In Reading Capital, meanwhile, the ‘‘consistency’’ of each of these
levels of the social formation, further complicated by the copresence of dif-
ferent modes of production, is endowed with its own speciﬁc temporality.
Althusser insists that none may be translated back into a single, all-deﬁning
historical time: ‘‘We should not deduce from this that history is made up
of the juxtaposition of different ‘relatively’ autonomous histories, different
historical temporalities, living the same historical time . . . the ideological
model of a continuous time subject to essential sections into presents.’’42
This is because the idea that an ‘‘essential’’ spirit may deﬁne the whole
is, of course, a mark of the Hegelianism he opposes. The social forma-
tion is here deﬁned by its radical temporal heterogeneity, whose histori-
cal unity qua social formation it is, however, difﬁcult to conceive. Althus-
ser goes on to develop this idea further as an ‘‘aleatory materialism’’ in his
studies of Machiavelli.43 Thus, difference buries development—but only for
it to reappear, as we shall see, in another political form. As Perry Ander-
41. Louis Althusser, For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (London: New Left Books, 1977), 206.
I will refer in particular to the essay ‘‘Contradiction and Overdetermination,’’ 87–129. Here-
after, this work is cited parenthetically as FM.
42. Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, trans. Ben Brewster (London:
Verso, 1979), 104.
43. Louis Althusser, Machiavelli and Us, trans. Gregory Elliot (London and New York:
Verso, 1999), 18.
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son suggests, the lack of a principle of uniﬁcation around a shared ‘‘soci-
etal time’’ threatens to leave Althusser with ‘‘a mere empirical pluralism: a
variegated host of ‘circumstances’ and ‘currents.’ ’’ Anderson’s alternative
is twofold. First, he proposes the formal but ‘‘scientiﬁc’’ idea of chronologi-
cal time. Second, and most important here, he proposes the experience of
unevenness in the development of capitalism, which traverses and struc-
tures all social formations considered mainly as separate nation-states. He
will go on to ﬂesh out this position, for example, in his response to Mar-
shall Berman’s account of modernity, producing a historically more nuanced
account of an ‘‘overdetermined conﬁguration’’ characterized by the copres-
ence of ‘‘different temporalities.’’ This is the signiﬁcance of the idea of ‘‘con-
juncture.’’ Coined by Althusser, it gives uneven development a momentary,
political unity.44
The concept of overdetermination constitutes an attempt to unify the
centripedal logic of uneven development in Althusser’s sense, and does so
politically in the related idea of ‘‘conjuncture’’—in other words, it provides for
a political totalization of the social.45 In For Marx, Althusser counterposes
Lenin’s analyses of the political conjuncture that made the Russian Revolu-
tion possible to the antipolitical historicism of Hegel’s analysis of the Roman
World in The Philosophy of History. The problem with Hegel’s dialectic is
that it is moved by a simple contradiction. And it is simple because it is
structured by relations of interiority. Complexity in Hegel’s account, even
the multiplicity of determinations conﬁguring any particular ‘‘world,’’ is an
illusion, since spirit is self-positing and self-centered. For Hegel, Althusser
notes, the ‘‘mighty history’’ of Rome is ‘‘nothing but the temporal manifes-
tation of the internal principle of the abstract legal personality and then its
destruction’’ (FM, 102). Furthermore, each present may contain the past,
but not as an ‘‘effective determination different from itself ’’ (FM, 102). This is
the moment of eternalization referred to above. The concept of overdeter-
44. Perry Anderson, Arguments within English Marxism (London: Verso, 1980), 77–78;
and ‘‘Marshall Berman: Modernity and Revolution,’’ in A Zone of Engagement (London
and New York: Verso, 1992), 25–55. For an overall critical commentary on Althusser and
Anderson, see Osborne, The Politics of Time, 1–29. For its subsequent appearance in
Néstor García Canclini’s notion of ‘‘hybridity,’’ see my ‘‘Hybridity in a Transnational Frame:
Latin Americanist and Postcolonial Perspectives on Cultural Studies,’’ in The Latin Ameri-
can Cultural Studies Reader, ed. Ana del Sarto, Alicia Ríos, and Abril Trigo (Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 2004), 736–59.
45. As Osborne has shown in The Politics of Time, this totalization is a synchronic one,
deﬁned by the temporality of the ‘‘instant.’’ Hence the notorious difﬁculty in Althusser’s
account of thinking historical change.
72 boundary 2 / Summer 2005
mination, in contrast, refers to a complex unity of contradictions deﬁned by
relations of exteriority, mutual determination (in dominance), and thus irre-
ducibility. He writes, ‘‘This is what is irreplaceable in Lenin’s texts: the analy-
sis of the structure of a conjuncture, the displacements and condensations
of its contradictions and their paradoxical unity’’ (FM, 179). But Althusser,
symptomatically, misses an important aspect of Hegel’s internalizing prin-
ciple of simple self-realization. In his account of the Roman World, Hegel
does indeed foreground abstract legal personality, as follows:
The course of Roman History . . . involves the expansion of unde-
veloped subjectivity—inward conviction of existence—to the visibility
of the real world. The principle of subjective inwardness receives
positive application in the ﬁrst place from without—through the par-
ticular volition of the sovereignty, the government, etc. The develop-
ment consists in the puriﬁcation of inwardness to abstract person-
ality, which gives itself reality in the existence of private property; the
mutually repellent social units can then be held together only by des-
potic power. The general course of the Roman World may be deﬁned
as this; the transition from the inner sanctum of subjectivity to its
direct opposite. (PH, 281; my emphasis)
Abstraction, in Hegel’s history, always implies a form of social abstraction,
and is thus very concrete. Here, in particular, ‘‘abstract legal personality’’
refers to the emergence of the principle of private property and its politi-
cal institution—individual freedom mediated by right. It is the latter, how-
ever, that is abolished by imperial despotism. The legacies of both sides
of this relation—private property and empire, endowed with lives and a
‘‘consistency’’ beyond the ‘‘simple contradiction’’ noted by Althusser—are,
of course, still crucial today, although Althusser may have missed them,
blinded by Lenin’s revolutionary conjuncture and the possibility of their abo-
lition.46 The keyword, however, is development. For it is what gives Hegel’s
simple contradiction, qua the history of spirit as the history of freedom, the
unity and temporal logic of an immanent principle of self-realization. In other
words, it temporalizes his history, accounting for what is passed on from
one World (‘‘civilization’’ or ‘‘mode of production’’) to the next. Althusser, in
other words, misses the very term that structures Hegel’s ‘‘simple’’ contra-
46. See Hardt and Negri, Empire; and William Spanos, America’s Shadow: An Anatomy
of Empire (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000). As Spanos shows, private
property is not the only legacy of the Roman Empire.
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diction, and it returns to haunt his own account of the historical conjuncture.
The problem is that such a developmentalist temporalization also structures
Lenin’s account of the conjuncture of theRussianRevolution, as well as both
Althusser’s and Anderson’s conceptualization of the overdetermined unity
of a conjuncture deﬁned by ‘‘uneven development.’’
Conjuncture and Disjuncture
The time of the conjuncture is punctual, deﬁned by its discontinuity.
This is its political and philosophical point. But it also, arguably, subordi-
nates historical analysis to the instrumental requirements of the balance
of political forces (rather than, for example, to the principle of freedom). At
the same time, however, a form of Marxist developmentalism threatens to
return to temporalize the uneven present with regard to the future. If, on
the one hand, Althusser’s politicization of history restores the present’s link
to the future-as-other (de-eternalizing the present of development), on the
other hand, it reintroduces a continuity—the idea of a revolutionary sub-
ject—founded on the developmentalism it negates. Lenin, he shows, was
confronted by a complex situation deﬁned by its uneven development: Rus-
sia was characterized by the coexistence of the most ‘‘advanced’’ with the
most ‘‘backward,’’ and thus was ‘‘pregnant with two revolutions’’ (FM, 97).
Althusser lists the different elements that, according to Lenin, characterized
the overdetermined moment of the revolutionary conjuncture in an attempt
to account for the success of the Bolsheviks: industrial cities, with an orga-
nized militant working class, existing alongside the ‘‘medieval state of the
countryside’’; contradictions within the ruling classes: aristocratic nobility,
lesser nobility, big and liberal bourgeoisie; as well as ‘‘an enormous mass
of ‘ignorant’ peasants’’ (Althusser is quoting Lenin), a ‘‘circumstance which
dictated a singular association of the peasant’s revolt with the worker’s revo-
lution’’ (FM, 96). As each aspect of the social formation is described, each
social class (or fraction of class) is endowed with historicity: some are asso-
ciated with the persistence of the feudal past in the present, while others
represent possible futures. The peasantry, in particular, is emptied of his-
tory, because their ‘‘ignorance’’ (lack of political Bildung) means they cannot
constitute possible subjects of historical transformation, that is, of freedom,
unless ‘‘associated’’ with the industrial workers, who thereby transformmere
revolt into social revolution. Proletarian historicity thus depends on a narra-
tive ordering and temporal reconstitution of the conjuncture (connecting it
to both past and future), precisely what it was designed to forestall; and so
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the ‘‘simple’’ principle of development returns, allocating political roles and
organizing the conjuncture historically. In other words, the political and cul-
tural work of ‘‘development’’ appears here to resolve a tension of its own
making (to become a materialist development in and of ‘‘development’’): on
the one hand, it needs to think emancipation temporally beyond the present,
in a way that allows for future difference, while on the other, simultaneously
depending on that very same present for the subject of such a future.
Two of the latest works by historians to engage with these issues
directly are Chakrabarty’s Provincializing Europe and Harry Harootunian’s
Overcome by Modernity. If their intellectual horizon is constituted by the
concept of modernity, what they in fact offer are not only the usual accounts
of ‘‘the experience of modernity in . . .’’ (Bengal or Japan, in these cases) but
also a set of detailed, complex reﬂections on the politics and culture of his-
torical spatiotemporalization. In both works, the issue of ‘‘development,’’ as a
key—but ideological—conﬁguration of the time of capital on, and across, an
inter- or transnational scale, is central to their critical concerns. Thus, empire
also looms large, although differently—since India was colonized and Japan
became a colonial power. In this respect, Chakrabarty and Harootunian are
cultural historians with theoretical intent. The ﬁgure of Althusser, and his cri-
tique of Hegelian-inspired historicism, is crucial to both historians’ works.
This means that their critiques of the idea of development have both political
content and philosophical implications. Via the generalization of Anderson’s
conjuncturalist account of modernism in Europe, for example, and with a
little help from the likes of Benjamin and Henri Lefebvre for his concept of
‘‘everydayness,’’ Harootunian remains on a transnationalized Althusserian
(and Marxist) terrain: the concept of overdetermination is fundamental to
Overcome by Modernity ’s theoretical ediﬁce, and the concept of the ‘‘every-
day’’ is what gives it concretion as a cultural experience. In Provincializing
Europe, however, Chakrabarty takes the criticism of historicism further and
arguably looks if not to abandon Marxism’s theoretical terrain deﬁnitively,
and what he terms ‘‘a politics of despair,’’ at the very least to severely relativ-
ize and problematize it (revealing its provincialism), taking ﬂight from Marx-
ism’s own teleological narratives—that is, its ‘‘developmentalism’’ (a sign of
Empire)—into the hands of a culturalist Heidegger and reﬂections on ques-
tions of cultural ‘‘belonging.’’ Chakrabarty thus attempts radically to relativize
(and spatialize) this tradition’s notion of freedom and its emplotment. The
importance of Althusser lies also, therefore, in that he provides the occasion
to note a substantive theoretical difference in approach between Provincial-
izing Europe and Overcome by Modernity with regard to thinking the poli-
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tics of modern historical time and its historiography: although the concept
of historical conjuncture as it is used by Harootunian, as well as the post-
colonial concept of difference mobilized by Chakrabarty, marks the limits of
historicist (and Imperial) narratives of the temporality of capital, that is, of
development, it does so in a different way. Which is to say that if Harootunian
advances a critical, cultural Marxist perspective on the temporal experience
of modernity, Chakrabarty, for his part, engages with the cultural and politi-
cal limitations of such a perspective. This, in other words, is the difference
between conjunctural and disjunctural critiques of development.
Chakrabarty’s Provincializing Europe emerges from his long asso-
ciation with the increasingly inﬂuential South Asian subaltern studies group
of historians and critics, whose most well-known members have included
Ranajit Guha, Partha Chatterjee, Gayatri Spivak, and Gyanendra Pandey.
According to Guha, the practice of history emerged in India as a colo-
nial project of juridico-political administration and state consolidation, trac-
ing genealogies, lineages, and traditions all the better to recodify them, for
example, along the lines of ‘‘the rule of property.’’ In this sense, history has a
clear disciplinary ‘‘civilizing’’ character. This is perhaps most clearly appar-
ent in the historical treatment of peasant insurgency, assiduously tracked
and documented by the state, for which, in Guha’s words, ‘‘causality was
harnessed to counter-insurgency and the sense of history converted into
an element of administrative concern.’’47 History is, therefore, linked to the
state, the colonial state. The point of departure of such a critical ‘‘subaltern-
ist’’ perspective, its own key political concern, was that such a disavowal of
peasant political subjectivity in history (both historically and historiographi-
cally), however modiﬁed, subsequently characterized both the nationalist
and communist movements, too. The peasantry, and other mainly rural
intermediate not-quite class formations, including so-called prepolitical ban-
ditry, and their varied forms of consciousness, were denied political agency
or ‘‘maturity,’’ that is, they were ‘‘subalternized’’—put into the past for their
lack of futurity as their very presence was traced (that is, narrativized out
of history, only to be re-presented as ‘‘people without history’’). The work of
spectralization, indeed.
The sustained reﬂections of Guha (and other subalternist writers)
engage with the European philosophical history of this developmentalist
paradigm in Kant, Hegel, and Marx, at both political and philosophical
47. Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India, 2nd ed.
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999), 2–3.
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levels.48 But if, for example, Spivak’s subalternist-Marxist critique of Marx
in A Critique of Postcolonial Reason reveals the latter’s developmentalism
through a critique of his hesitant ‘‘civilizational’’ use of the idea of ‘‘the Asiatic
mode of production,’’49 Chakrabarty aims not only at Marxist narratives of
transition to capitalism, including such ideas as ‘‘incomplete’’ and ‘‘uneven’’
development, but also at the related ‘‘economic’’ heart of Marx’s Capital
itself: the theory of value and the social logic of abstraction. This, of course,
is where he follows and exceeds—with a fundamental postcolonial twist—
Althusser’s own critical gesture. The idea is to show that ‘‘abstraction,’’
like Hegel’s ‘‘spirit’’—whose history is the history of freedom—has determi-
nate cultural-political content (and is thus not so abstract) that encodes the
experience (and, arguably, the misrecognition) of the history of capitalism in
Europe as a general emancipatory imperative—the form taken in subaltern-
ism of the idea that difference turns against development as more devel-
opment. This is the sense in which their critique of development is also a
critique of the imperial time of capital—its ‘‘spirit’’—and its implications for
political subjectivity.
If Chakrabarty would seem to retreat from emancipation in his re-
sponse to such a myth of politico-cultural spiritual accumulation, Guha in-
sists instead on the historicity of that political subject originally expelled
from history (if not from poetry) by Hegel in his state-centered account: ‘‘the
people.’’ In Guha’s view, the subaltern Indian people, as well as their politi-
cal practice, exist ‘‘at the very limits of translatability of Western codes,’’ that
is, at ‘‘the historic threshold that the so-called universalism of a Eurocentric
reason and its engine of global expansion—capital—failed to cross in the
age of colonialism.’’50 For Guha, the misrecognized ‘‘people’’—the objects
of both colonial and postcolonial nation-states, their historical narratives,
and their policy (that is, the objects of the total apparatus of development)—
nevertheless established an ‘‘autonomous domain’’ from which to historicize
anew with political intent. Their ‘‘subaltern’’ character is not just an effect of
their apparent subordination and ideological desubjectivization in colonial
and nationalist perspectives but also emerges from their nonidentity with
the class-based (and industrialized) subject positions of classical commu-
48. Both Guha and Chakrabarty also criticize the developmentalism of radical historians
such as E. J. Hobsbawm and E. P. Thompson along similar lines.
49. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Towards a History of
the Vanishing Present (Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press, 1999).
50. Ranajit Guha, introduction to A Subaltern Studies Reader, 1986–1995, ed. Ranajit
Guha (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), xx.
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nist theory and practice. For Guha, the notion of a subaltern ‘‘people’’ thus
provides for both an alternative emancipatory political rationale and its his-
toricity. It is this latter step that Spivak, for her part, refuses to make, sug-
gesting that its danger may be to relocate the subalternized as subjects
back inside the terms of a developmentalist script deﬁned by their exclusion.
From this perspective, Spivak insists on an epistemological break that, on
the one hand, responds ethically to (and learns from) the political agency of
the subalternized, while on the other, refuses to proceed to fabricate a new
world-historical subject from them.
Translated back into Hegel’s terms, subalternism, at its most radi-
cal, constitutes a critique of a political rationality that endows historicity
and of a historicity that endows political rationality. That is, of a Bildung in
which a particular history as a formative process is generalized as the uni-
versal condition of freedom and its subjects in the form of development.
Such history, as posed by the logic of capital, says Chakrabarty, is the mod-
ern history of ‘‘Enlightenment universals,’’ universals that are fundamentally
constitutive of the modern world, of thought, and of futures that ‘‘will be.’’
This he refers to as History 1. Albeit dominant, however, this is only one
of the ‘‘many modes of being’’ in the world, of inhabiting a fundamentally—
because, according to Heidegger, futural in a plurality of undisclosedways—
heterogeneous present: ‘‘futures that already are there, the futurity that
humans cannot avoid aligning themselves with.’’ This he calls History 2. The
function of Chakrabarty’s concept of ‘‘difference’’ thus becomes clear in his
nonhistoricist history: it seeks to reconnect the ‘‘local,’’ the affective experi-
ences of ‘‘dwelling’’ and ‘‘belonging’’ to universality in a relation of disjunc-
ture: these experiences ‘‘are what makes it impossible to sum up a present
through any totalizing principle. They make the ‘now’ constantly fragmen-
tary, but the fragments are not additive; they do not suggest a totality or
a whole. The constant and open-ended modiﬁcation of the future that ‘will
be’ by the futures that ‘are’ parallels the ongoing modiﬁcation of History 1
by History 2s.’’ With regard to Marx: one of Chakrabarty’s suggestions to
recover ‘‘difference,’’ a sort of culturalist kernel or ‘‘life-world,’’ within the logic
of abstraction in Marx’sCapital, is to read concrete, real labor (History 2)—a
labor that ‘‘belongs’’ and ‘‘dwells,’’ stubbornly refusing dedifferentiation, and
that lives, so to speak—against the developmentalist grain of the logic of
abstract labor (History 1).51
51. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, 47–51. As I have suggested above, however,
the in-difference of value—including that of commodiﬁed (abstract) labor—works through
(in-)difference.
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InOvercome by Modernity, Harootunian also denarrativizes, and de-
links the spatial connections of the ‘‘imperialist chain’’ that attempt to explain
the emergence of Japanese fascism from the point of view of the ‘‘excep-
tional’’ character of its experience of capitalist modernity. His book fero-
ciously criticizes such notions as ‘‘alternativemodernity’’ and ‘‘uneven devel-
opment’’ because, in the guise of radical criticism, they in fact sustain the
normative myths of a ‘‘model’’ modernity or of ‘‘even’’ development. A study
of Japanese interwar modernism, Overcome by Modernity does not pro-
vide an account of the rise of fascism as such but of one of its cultural and
ideological conditions: a strong modernist antimodern intellectual formation
responding to Japanese rapid industrialization, urbanization, and massiﬁ-
cation with thoughts of empire, militarism and communalism, authenticity
and revolution. Harootunian insists that insofar as modernism expresses a
crisis of both political and historical representation (denarrativization and
respatialization were, Haroootunian reminds us, modernist tropes) in a con-
text whose horizon is deﬁned by war, conservative and ethnically absolut-
ist critiques of modernity are not intrinsically exceptional and/or speciﬁcally
national. They occurred not only in Japan (and India, Chakrabarty might
add) but also throughout Europe (and not only in Germany, Italy, or Spain)
and the Americas. This idea is crucial to his overall theoretical argument. For
one of the key points Harootunian makes is that there is only uneven capi-
talist development. Which means that the capitalist world cannot be spa-
tially divided according to nations that develop either evenly or unevenly,
because this would imply the existence of an embodied and locatable model
‘‘true time’’ (an idea, for example, of European nations held by implication in
some forms of dependency theory). Uneven development is thus a matter
of rates and speeds, but within and across each nation-state, rather than
just between them. Japanese modernity is an ‘‘inﬂection of a larger global
process,’’ a ‘‘co-eval modernity,’’ its modernisms (both revolutionary and con-
servative) the product of ‘‘the jarring co-existence of several pasts and the
present in the now of everydayness, often in a relation of unevenness.’’52
From Harootunian’s point of view, one might say that in fact the discourse
of exceptionalism is itself a powerful form of reactionary modernism.
How does Harootunian put the idea of conjuncture to work in Over-
come by Modernity? By limiting, denaturalizing, and repoliticizing the nor-
52. Harry Harootunian,Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Inter-
war Japan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000). See, in particular, his meth-
odological preface, ‘‘All the Names of History,’’ ix–xxxii.
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mative effects of the rhetorics of development (which Harootunian himself
at times maintains—he speaks of ‘‘late-developers,’’ for example) such that,
now, with Chakrabarty’s work in view, possible futures emerge, ﬁrst, from
a present in which overlapping historical temporalities are gathered (that
is, Anderson’s overdetermined conjuncture in which the past persists, the
present is in ﬂux, and the future uncertain),53 and, second, from political
and ideological conﬂict, where, the Japanese example makes clear, the
‘‘enlightenment universals’’ associated with the progressive developmental-
ist history of History 1 will not necessarily ‘‘be,’’ because a mobilized alli-
ance of History 2s—a veritable war machine—might subordinate it to mili-
tarism, empire, and the ‘‘communal body.’’ The concept of conjuncture thus
relocates difference, and History 2, alongside a dethroned History 1, in a
complex and uncertain ﬁeld of political possibility.
From the point of view of Provincializing Europe, however, Harootu-
nian’s work would seem to re-present—and not only in its underlying nar-
rativization of the overlapping temporalities that constitute the space of the
present (past, present, and future with their corresponding social and politi-
cal agencies)—an urban and Fordist-centered conception of modernity that
may re-subalternize and ignore, for example, rural laborers (including peas-
ants), who belong neither to a persistent ‘‘agrarian political order . . . with its
semi-aristocratic ruling class (in Japan marked by the entrenchment of the
emperor, the court, and those oligarchs who could claim the right domainal
credentials)’’ nor to an urban-centered ‘‘emergent industrial capitalist sys-
tem with its incipient labour movement.’’54 It is not that those so excluded
necessarily represent an alternative, privileged subject of history in this con-
text; it is, rather, that the temporalization involved within the overdetermined
conjuncture thus fashioned writes them out of consideration as mere rep-
resentatives of the past. Harootunian’s response might be, ﬁrst, to ques-
tion the ways in which Chakrabarty’s History 2 would seem to be ‘‘immune
to the social abstractions of capitalism,’’55 that is, to what I have termed
the ‘‘in-difference’’ of capital (particularly in its idealized conception of con-
53. See Harootunian, Overcome by Modernity : ‘‘But what distinguished this conjuncture
most in Japan, and undoubtedly elsewhere, was the co-existence of the place between
pre-capitalist pasts that had not yet disappeared with capitalism, industrialization in an
indeterminate present being lived by large numbers of people in the cities, and, ﬁnally, an
unenvisaged future that thinkers were trying to imagine on the basis of what had already
changed’’ (xviii–xix).
54. Harootunian, Overcome by Modernity, xix.
55. Harootunian, Overcome by Modernity, xxvi.
80 boundary 2 / Summer 2005
crete labor, whose cultural embodiment only seems to signify disjuncture),
and, second, to insist on the resistance to narrative generalization that the
idea of conjuncture entails, its sensibility to ‘‘difference,’’ as well as to the
political correlation of forces that establishes what ‘‘will be.’’ That, in other
words, disjuncture needs conjuncture (which, as we have seen, also seems
to need development). What both conceptions reveal, however, is the con-
tinuing ideological and conceptual power of the idea of development and the
difﬁculty in theoretically overcoming the contradiction between the promise
of freedom and its restriction that it bears.
